With the Articles of Confederation not being sufficient for a union of the 13 states, a convention was called to create a new Constitution that provided a stronger and more empowered federal government. Those in favor of the Constitution and more centralized governance were known as Federalists and those opposed were called Anti-Federalists. Without the Bill of Rights, the Anti-Federalists had reasoning in their fear that liberty was not protected, but the proposed republic with its organization of government in the Constitution had more safeguards against the loss of freedom than the current system that kept most power in the states.

The Anti-Federalists were concerned about how the Constitution alone failed to protect the liberties and rights of the people explicitly. Elbridge Gerry, an Anti-Federalist, was opposed to the proposed Constitution, because he wanted people’s liberties protected. As a Constitutional Congress delegate from Massachusetts, he probably was also hesitant to accept the Constitution, because, like most state government officials, he did not want his state to lose its power. Gerry was concerned about the loss of freedoms and in his letter to Massachusetts General Court said, “Should the citizens of America adopt the plan as it now stands, their liberties may be lost” (Gerry pg. 254). He had reason to believe that freedom could be lost, because the Constitution alone did nothing to guarantee any specific freedoms. It provided a new stronger federal government. With this letter being addressed to the Massachusetts General Court, the audience of the letter would easily have been focused on the loss of their power and eager to join his opposition to the central government. Due to the fear of the possibility of a tyrannical government that it left open, the Anti-Federalists were reluctant to accept the Constitution.

While both touch on individual and state liberties, neither the Constitution nor Articles of Confederation lay out what the specific liberties are and that they need to be defended. The Articles of Confederation mention the states’, “security of their liberties,” while the Constitution says, “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.” Neither of these says what exactly those liberties or rights are, thus both constitutions leave the individual with the possibility of an oppressive government from either the states or the proposed federal government. Alexander Hamilton, a Federalist, was an advocate for central governance, due to his Hobbesian belief that people were naturally evil. With an overseeing government, he believed that people could be protected from themselves. Hamilton says in The Federalist No. 85, “Among pretended defects, are…the omission of a formal bill of rights, the omission of a provision respecting the liberty of the press:…are as much chargeable on the existing constitution of this state, as the one proposed for the Union” (Hamilton pg. 245). In revealing that the alleged flaw of no bill of rights in the Constitution also exists in the Articles, the Anti-Federalists lose support for their reasoning in keeping the current constitution. While Hamilton points out that there was an apparent lack of security for individual liberties in both the current constitution and the proposed one, he believes that there would be no more of a risk of tyranny under the new Constitution.

With the Constitution outlining a federal republic, there was fear that too large a republic would fail to express the interests of the people. It is first important to realize that before the Constitution still, the state governments were republic in form. The citizens elected representatives to the state government that made laws. The proposed Constitution would empower a stronger federal government that would be a republic of the states. One of the complaints of Brutus I, an Anti-Federalist, is that the large republic would not represent all the people’s interests. He says, “In a free republic, although all laws are derived from the consent of the people, yet the people do not declare their consent by themselves in person, but by representatives, chosen by them, who are supposed to know the minds of their constituents, and to be possessed of integrity to declare this mind” (Brutus I, Brutus I (An Anti-Federalist) October 17, 1787). Brutus I is correct in realizing that the representatives elected to the government cannot possibly always know what the people they are representing think and want. He must remember, however, that this is the case for both the state and the federal republics. Brutus I, in addressing New York, was trying to also appeal to the state’s interest in state-governing power. By arguing that a federal republic was too large and a state-sized one was functional, Brutus I hoped to deter the state from accepting the Constitution. Brutus I defended his belief that a large republic could not represent the individual interests of those they should be representing as well as those in a smaller republic.

The elective procedures of the new government permit both the people and state government to have control over those who represent them. Brutus I’s concern over lack of accurate representation missed the problem of attachment to political issues. James Madison pointed out that by having one’s estate and person attached to that which he is ruling, the individual creates more of a bias than otherwise would be present. Madison claimed to have found a median for the two polar stances in Federalist No. 10, “The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures” (Madison, Federalist No. 10). With the state legislatures having the ability to elect their senators in the proposed Constitution, they would have direct representation in legislation, which is important so each state has their voices heard and counted by the federal government. This mix of federal and state government is important in bringing balance toward issues, so that no state can take advantage of others. Madison continues later on describing how different amounts of property lead to differing concerns on issues. Due to the differing perspectives on these issues, there will always be a majority and minority on policies, including under a complete democracy. Therefore, some people will always be unhappy with the actions of the representatives in a republic, large and small. In an elective republic, the electors have the ability to send someone else to represent them if the previous politician failed to accurately defend their interests.

Each state had the ability to preserve its prosperity and the people’s freedom by having state-government elected Senators in Congress under the Constitution. Another problem that was brought up by Brutus I is of man’s thirst for more power. He feared that with a strong federal government the state legislatures would be dissolved, leading to a tyranny that suppressed the liberties of the individual. First, addressing the appetite for power, Hamilton pointed out in Federalist No. 6 that, being a natural aspect of humanity, state government too would look to increase their power. In the case of the states, they might try to become stronger and suppress the rights of other states in terms of commerce and rivalries. When looking at the federal yearning for power, since the states would have direct say in the Congress of any laws taking rights away from them, there was less a chance of tyranny. Finally, it must be realized that under the proposed Constitution, the states and citizens would have there rights and liberties more secured than under the current system. In Federalist No. 51, Alexander Hamilton or James Madison explained the safety net system of having both federal and state governance. He said, “In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people” (Hamilton or Madison, Federalist No. 51). With the double governance, it would be harder for one of the governments to create a law that would infringe on the liberties of the individual and/or state. Due to the states’ appointment of representatives in the federal republic, their interests were protected because of the states’ individual governance added along with the federal governance by representatives in the lawmaking body, thus the new Constitution protected liberty better than the Articles of Confederation.

In conclusion, the states had reason to be hesitant in their adoption of the Constitution due to the lack of protection of liberties, but the new federal republic better protected those liberties than the governance-oriented Articles of Confederation. With state governments already having republic form, they were subject to similar faults of a larger republic. By having the Constitution enable a set of double governance, states had less reason to fear the loss of freedom and the oppression of other states. It is important to realize that the government outlined in the Constitution is by no means perfect. Both Federalists and Anti-Federalists agree that with man being imperfect, so is any government created by man. Even though a government is created with the best intentions usually, those who follow in power are not always guided by the same morals, which can lead to a suppression of freedom. Since it is impossible to know exactly what would have happened if the Articles of Confederation continued to be the only centralization of power, there is no guarantee that the federal republic under the Constitution is actually better in practice. It is certainly possible that individual and state liberty would have been better protected under the Articles. In its massiveness today, the government far exceeds what the original states would have ever permitted and is evidence of the Anti-Federalist’s opposition, but under the form of government of the Constitution, the people have the power to elect officials that could shrink the federal government and give more control back to the states (however this is unlikely to actually occur). If one is to complain that the states have lost their capacity to the federal government, it is the states that must take the blame. The 17th Amendment, which gave Senatorial election powers to the people instead of the state legislature, put all electoral procedures in the hands of the people. This was a dangerous move, because people in general have no idea what is happening in politics besides what the television tells them. As can be seen with President Obama, a person can run on promises with self-proclaimed zero experience and get elected. The biggest effect, however, of the 17th Amendment was the fact that the states no longer had their interests represented in federal government. Without this vital part of checks and balances, the federal government has grown into a tyrannical entity that is expanding its powers each and everyday. The Constitution has become more of a set of guidelines and is laughed at when discussing bills. In order to restore the republic that has fallen, we as a people must shrink the size of federal government and give power back to the people and state governments.







Works Cited
“Articles of Confederation,” Article III (1778). Archiving Early America, 10/02/09. <>.

Gerry, Elbridge. Elbridge Gerry to the Massachusetts General Court , October 18th, 1787. Ed. Michael Kammen. England: Penguin Books, 1986.

Hamilton, Alexander. The Federalist No. 6. Ed. Michael Kammen. England: Penguin Books, 1986.

Hamilton, Alexander. The Federalist No. 85. Ed. Michael Kammen. England: Penguin Books, 1986.

“United States Constitution,” Article IV, Section II (1787). Archiving Early America, 10/02/09. <>.